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Abstract 
This commentary focuses on explaining the intuition of revelation, an issue that 
Chalmers (2018) raises in his paper. I first sketch how the truth of revelation provides 
an explanation for the intuition of revelation, and then assess a physicalist proposal 
to explain the intuition that appeals to Derk Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative 
inaccuracy hypothesis.   
 
1. Introduction 
Recently, philosophers have appealed to revelation – the thesis that the essences of 
phenomenal properties are revealed in experience – to argue against physicalism (e.g. 
Goff 2017; Nida-Rümelin 2007). Revelation is often thought to be intuitive. Chalmers 
(2018: 25) himself notes that the intuition of revelation may be responsible for 
generating problem intuitions concerning consciousness, but that it ‘remains to 
provide an explanation of why we have the sense of … revelation’.  
This paper addresses what explains the intuition of revelation. After 
clarifying revelation, I outline an explanation for the intuition of revelation that 
appeals to the truth of revelation. I then assess a physicalist proposal that draws on 
Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis.  
 
2. Revelation  
In the literature, revelation has been given various formulations. Sometimes, it is 
formulated with respect to phenomenal concepts (Goff 2017; Nida-Rümelin 2007); 
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sometimes, with respect to introspection (Chalmers 2018: 25). But neither of these two 
philosophical notions is necessary in formulating revelation (Lewis 1995; Stoljar 2009; 
Liu 2019). The basic idea is that by having an experience with phenomenal property 
Q, we are in a position to know the nature or essence of Q.  
We can understand knowledge of the essence of a property in terms of 
knowledge of some truth which captures, i.e. accurately describes, what the property 
is in its most core respects.1 For instance, in knowing the truth ‘being triangular is 
having a three-sided closed shape’, one knows the essence of the property of 
triangularity – what triangularity is in its most core respects. The predicate ‘having a 
three-sided closed shape’ captures the essence of triangularity.  
Revelation can thus be understood as the claim that by having an experience-
token with phenomenal property Q, one is in a position to know the truth ‘Q is X’, 
where the predicate ‘X’ captures the essence of Q. Note that we find ourselves devoid 
of words to describe the phenomenal characters of many experiences. If I attempt to 
define what phenomenal redness is, it might seem that all I can say is that ‘It is that’, 
using a demonstrative as a placeholder for my rich understanding of phenomenal 
redness which I cannot put into words. So, it seems that this essence-capturing truth 
‘Q is X’, known through having an experience with Q according to revelation, may 
be hard to put into words.  
 Given the aforesaid, revelation can be formulated as consisting of the 
following two claims:  
(i) By having an experience-token with phenomenal property 
Q, one is in a position to know de dicto that Q is X.  
(ii)  ‘X’ captures the essence of Q. 
 
1 ‘Capture’ here should not be taken just to mean ‘refer to, latch onto’; it is understood as 
‘representing accurately in words or pictures’ (see Loar 1990). Phenomenal concept 
strategists such as Loar would say that phenomenal concepts ‘capture’, in the sense of 
referring to but not in the sense of representing accurately, physical/functional properties. Such 
physicalists would reject revelation.  
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Revelation thus formulated is incompatible with standard versions of physicalism 
(see Liu 2019). According to standard physicalism, phenomenal properties are 
physical/functional properties with physical/functional essences, and the essence-
capturing truth ‘Q is X’ is some physical/functional truth where the predicate ‘X’ is a 
physical/functional predicate, e.g. ‘Q is being an event of C-fibres firing’. But in 
having an experience with phenomenal property Q, we are certainly not in a position 
to know such a truth ‘Q is X’ where ‘X’ is a physical/functional predicate. So, given 
revelation, standard versions of physicalism are false.  
 
3. Explaining the Intuition of Revelation  
Revelation is often thought of as intuitive by philosophers including Chalmers (2018:  
25) and, notably, many physicalists (e.g. Lewis 1995; McLaughlin 2003; Hill 2014). 
One might think that the intuition of revelation – the fact that we believe/judge or are 
disposed to believe/judge revelation to be true – provides prima facie support for the 
truth of revelation, which figures as the crucial premise in an argument against 
physicalism. A physicalist might then want to explain away the intuition of revelation, 
explaining it in a way that does not appeal to the truth of revelation, and 
subsequently undermining the support it lends to revelation. Given our formulation 
of revelation, such a physicalist would have to explain why we judge or are disposed 
to judge the following claims to be correct (although, on the physicalist’s own 
account, they are not both true):  
(i) By having an experience with phenomenal property Q, 
one is in a position to know de dicto that Q is X.  
(ii) ‘X’ captures the essence of Q.   
Before I turn to a particular physicalist strategy for explaining away the intuition of 
revelation, let me show how the truth of revelation features in one possible 
explanation for the intuition of revelation.  
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If revelation is true, then phenomenal property Q manifests its essence – 
captured by the predicate ‘X’ – to the subject when the subject has an experience with 
Q. We can think of this manifestation as a kind of accurate phenomenal appearance 
of phenomenal properties – in having an experience with Q, it phenomenally appears 
to the subject that Q is X, where ‘X’ captures what it is like for a subject to have an 
experience with Q.2 Phenomenal appearances, which are experiences, are distinguished 
from epistemic appearances, which are beliefs, though the two are often intimately 
linked (Chisholm 1957). Our beliefs are often reasonable responses to our experiences. 
We can say that upon having an experience in which it phenomenally appears that 
Q is X, the subject is rationally disposed to judge that Q is X and, in normal 
circumstances, this judgement constitutes knowledge.  
So, our having experiences of which revelation is true, together with our 
possessing the relevant concepts, i.e. concepts of experience, phenomenal properties, and 
knowledge, explains our actually making or being disposed to make, not only 
judgements of the form ‘Q is X’, but also (and crucially for present purposes) 
judgements of the form (i). The fact that experience does not present Q as anything 
else but X, together with our possessing the concept of essence, explains why we 
would judge or be disposed to judge (ii).  
 
4. Introspective Inaccuracy  
A physicalist explanation for the intuition of revelation cannot appeal to the truth of 
revelation but it might appeal to Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative inaccuracy 
hypothesis (QIH), which Chalmers (2018: 25) also mentions. Pereboom (2011: 14) 
thinks that introspective representation might be inaccurate in the sense that 
introspection systematically ‘represents phenomenal properties as having qualitative 
natures they do not in fact have’ (see also 2016, 2019). By ‘qualitative natures of 
 
2  This accurate phenomenal appearance is not a separate experience distinct from the 
experience with Q.  
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phenomenal properties’, Pereboom (2016: 173) means ‘the what-it’s-like features of 
sensory states’ which, he says, are ‘illusory in that they don’t exist’. As I read 
Pereboom, he allows an experience to have a so-called ‘phenomenal’ property Q, but 
does not allow that Q is a what-it-is-like property, nor that Q has what-it-is-like 
features (which might be captured by ‘X’). A physicalist who wants to explain away 
the intuition of revelation might appeal to Pereboom’s QIH and say, first, that this 
systematic introspective misrepresentation of Q as having the what-it-is-like features 
X explains why we judge or are disposed to judge (i); and, second, that since 
introspection does not represent Q as anything else but X, we also judge or are 
disposed to judge (ii). 
As it stands, QIH is unclear because there are two ways to understand the 
notion of ‘introspective representation’ (see Stoljar 2013; Kammerer 2018). One is to 
say that an introspective representation is a belief, understood as ‘epistemic 
appearance’. To say that introspection represents Q as X is to say that the subject 
introspectively believes/judges that Q is X. Call this version of QIH ‘QIH-ep’. 
Alternatively, an introspective representation is an experience, understood as 
‘phenomenal appearance’. To say that introspection represents Q as X is to say that 
it phenomenally appears that Q is X. Call this version of QIH ‘QIH-ph’. I shall argue 
that neither version of QIH both seems plausible and explains the intuition of 
revelation.    
 
4.1. QIH-ep 
An experience e has a phenomenal property Q which, in reality, has a physical nature 
and no what-it-is-like features captured by ‘X’. The subject of experience falsely 
believes that Q is X. But experiencing Q as X and believing Q to be X are, intuitively, 
phenomenologically distinct. QIH-ep counterintuitively entails that we are not in a 
position to make such a distinction from the inside (Stoljar 2013: 748). On QIH-ep, 
although we think that there is an experience in which Q is presented as X, there is 
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only the false belief that Q is X. So, there is at least a question mark against the 
plausibility of QIH-ep. 
QIH-ep also does not seem to explain why we (are disposed to) judge (i):  
(i) By having an experience with phenomenal property Q, 
one is in a position to know de dicto that Q is X (where ‘X’ 
captures what-it-is-like features). 
The intuition of (i) cannot be explained by appeal to – borrowing terminology from 
Hill (1991: 128) – subjects’ errors of ignorance about their own experiences (i.e. ‘when 
beliefs are based on [phenomenal] appearances that fail to do justice to the entities to 
which the beliefs refer’), because on QIH-ep there is simply no experience in which 
Q phenomenally appears to be X – there is just the experience e with Q, which does not 
have what-it-is-like features, and the belief that Q is X.  
Nor can the intuition of (i) be explained by appeal to – borrowing another term 
from Hill (ibid.) – errors of judgement arising from inattention or expectation. No 
amount of attention would bring the subject closer to the true (physical) nature of Q if 
that nature is hidden. A subject cannot possibly expect Q to be X without possessing 
the phenomenal concept expressed by the predicate ‘X’, and possession of such a 
concept usually depends on having had an experience whose phenomenal property 
has those what-it-is-like features.3 
 
4.2. QIH-ph 
Pereboom (2011, 2016, 2019) himself prefers to understand introspective 
representations as experiences, and to explain the false belief that Q is X on the basis 
of false (phenomenal) appearances:  
 
3 This point does not rely on a general principle that, for every concept C, possession of C 
requires acquaintance with cases that fall under C. It is not arbitrary to suppose that 
recognitional concepts of what-it-is-like features may be somewhat distinctive in this 
respect. 
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The open possibility I am envisioning [QIH] would have us 
making errors of ignorance in our introspection-based beliefs 
about phenomenal properties, since such beliefs would be based 
on appearances that fail to do justice to the real qualitative nature 
of those properties. (Pereboom 2011: 22, fn33).  
Suppose I have an experience e1 with phenomenal property Q which has a physical 
nature. On QIH-ph, it is an illusion that Q has what-it-is-like features X. This illusion 
involves a separate but simultaneous second-order experience, e2, (mis)representing 
Q as having what-it-is-like features X, and mediating between e1 and the 
introspective belief that Q is X. 
Now, since e2 is an experience, it has a phenomenal property Q’, but Q’, like 
e1’s property Q, lacks what-it-is-like features. Given that there is nothing it is like for 
the subject to have experience e2, one might wonder whether e2’s misrepresentation 
of Q is sufficient to create the illusion that Q has what-it-is-like features X. Furthermore, 
Q’, like Q, also seems to have what-it-is-like features, and this, too, must be an illusion 
on QIH-ph and needs to be accounted for. In response, Pereboom (2016: 177–8; see 
also 2011: 27–8) suggests, or at least allows, a further layer of introspective 
misrepresentation, an experience e3 which represents Q’ as having what-it-is-like 
features (X’, say). That is, experience e3 represents there being something it is like for 
the subject, for e2 to represent e1’s property Q as having what-it-is-like features. 
If the illusion that Q is X (on which the false belief that Q is X is to be based) 
actually requires e3, in addition to e2, then it may seem that the requirement will iterate, 
leading to a regress of introspective misrepresentations. But Pereboom denies that 
QIH-ph generates such a regress: ‘[a]t some level, I form only a belief, without 
distinctive phenomenology, that I am representing a mental state’ (2016: 178). 
Suppose that, with e1, e2 and e3 in place, the subject judges that Q is X. How can that 
judgement, and the resulting belief, be based on the illusion that Q is X if there is 
nothing it is like for the subject to have the three experiences that are supposed to 
create the illusion? 
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Perhaps it will be suggested that the judgement that Q is X is enabled by a 
false belief that there is something it is like to have experience e3, or that e3’s property 
Q’’ has what-it-is-like features X’’. But it would remain to explain how the belief that 
Q’’ is X’’ figures in the aetiology of the belief that Q is X. And we should need an 
account – avoiding the problems that face QIH-ep – of how the false belief that Q’’ is 
X’’ arises without a corresponding experiential misrepresentation.4 
In short, it is unclear that QIH-ph can explain intuition (i). Also, there is a 
question mark against the plausibility of QIH-ph because the model of introspection 
it assumes is controversial (e.g. Stoljar 2013: 748). Furthermore, Pereboom himself 
seems rather cautious about his illusionist proposal and acknowledges that it ‘resists 
imaginative conception’ (2019: 192). A friend of revelation would surely insist that 
the truth of revelation offers a much better explanation for the intuition of revelation.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Recall the two components of revelation:  
(i) By having an experience with phenomenal property 
Q, one is in a position to know de dicto that Q is X.  
(ii)  ‘X’ captures the essence of Q.   
Understood a certain way, (i) seems compelling regardless of whether revelation is 
true: by having an experience with quale Q, one is in a position to know that Q is X, 
where ‘X’ captures the what-it-is-like features of Q (though this might be hard to put 
into words). The truth of revelation, as we saw, offers a straightforward explanation 
for the intuition of (i). Given (i) thus understood, my position is that there is more 
reason to motivate the claim that the essence of Q is revealed in experience, hence (ii), 
 
4 It was suggested to me that the belief that Q’’ is X’’ could be explained by appealing to 
expectations: since we have already believed Q to be X, and Q’ to be X’, we might also expect 
Q’’ to be X’’. But if the ground-level illusion and belief that Q is X are causally posterior to 
the third-level belief that Q’’ is X’’, then perhaps an expectation account of how the third-
level belief arises is not so plausible. 
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than to argue that it is hidden. But some physicalists would of course disagree and 
deny (ii) in spite of agreeing to (i) where ‘X’ captures the what-it-is-like features of Q.  
Illusionists, Pereboom included, take a more radical approach. They maintain 
that (i) (where ‘X’ captures the what-it-is-like features of Q) is in fact erroneous. But 
the denial of (i) thus understood is highly counterintuitive. Illusionists need to 
explain the intuition of (i) in a way that does not make their proposal unclear or 
implausible.5 They need to explain why the belief/judgement that Q is X arises and 
then extend this core explanation to account for the intuition of revelation and, 
specifically, for our disposition to believe (i). If such a physicalist explanation is 
wanting, then plausibly the truth of revelation provides the best explanation and 
given inference to the best explanation, revelation is indeed true.6  
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